演講者簡介 : Mr. Yu will receive his Ph.D. from University of Minnesota at 2016. He is currently a Research Analyst at Federal Reserve bank of Minneapolis. His research fields are Microeconomic Theory, Contract Theory, Public Economics, and Behavioral Economics.
演講摘要 : This paper studies a model of taxation where the government faces time-inconsistent agents with private information on productivity. I study both non-sophisticated and sophisticated agents. I demonstrate how the government can achieve a full insurance outcome despite information asymmetry, and consumption smoothing despite the time-inconsistency. In other words, when agents are time-inconsistent, the private information on productivity does not impede the government from implementing the first best allocation. For fully naive agents, this is accomplished by deceiving them into telling the truth. For sophisticated agents, the government provides them with a commitment device in exchange for truth-telling. While for agents who are partially naive, both types of mechanisms work. I present a possible way to implement the optimal allocations using income specific non-linear savings taxes. As an extension, I examine economies when time-consistent agents are present.
