Do Siblings Free-Ride in "Being There" for Parents?
2015/01/13
研討會日期 : 2015-01-13
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Shiko Maruyama
主持人 : Professor Kamhon Kan
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Maruyama received his Ph.D. in Economics from Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, USA in 2007. He is currently a Senior Lecturer at the Economics Discipline Group, University of Technology Sydney. His research fields are Health Economics, Industrial Organization, Microeconometrics, and Family Economics.
演講摘要 : When siblings are concerned for the well-being of their elderly parents, the costs of caregiving and long-term commitment create a free-rider problem. If siblings living near their parents can share the costs, this positive externality exacerbates the under-provision of proximate living. Location decisions allow siblings to make a commitment to not provide long-term support for parents, and if decisions are made in birth order, elder siblings may enjoy the first-mover advantage. To quantify these effects, we study siblings' location decisions relative to parents by estimating a sequential participation game that features rich heterogeneity. We find moderate altruism and cooperation in the US that imply: (1) limited strategic behavior: more than 90% of children have a dominant strategy; and (2) non-negligible free-riding: of the families with multiple children, had siblings fully internalized externality and jointly maximized their utility, 18.3% more parents would have had at least one child nearby.
