演講者簡介 : Professor Kim received his Ph.D. in Economics from The Ohio State University in 2014. He is currently an Assistant Professor at the National Taiwan University. His research fields are Positive political theory, Mechanism Design theory, Behavioral Economics, and Experimental Economics.
演講摘要 : We consider the design of decision rules in a simple Bayesian environment: There are two alternatives, agents have independent private values, and monetary transfers are not feasible. No symmetry between the agents or the alternatives is assumed. First, we characterize the utilitarian decision rule subject to incentive compatibility constraints and show that it is a weighted majority rule, where the weight of an agent corresponds to his expected gain if his favorite alternative is chosen. Second, we show that a decision rule is interim incentive efficient if and only if it is a weighted majority rule, and we characterize those weighted majority rules which are ex-ante incentive efficient. We also discuss the stability of weighted majority rules.
