Recent Advances in Bargaining Theory and Applications
2014/08/08
研討會日期 : 2014-08-08
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Cheng-Zhong Qin
主持人 : Professor Chun-Hsien Yeh
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Qin received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Iowa. He is currently The Maxwell C. and Mary Pellish Professor of Economics at University California, Santa Barbara. His research fields are Economic Theory, Industrial Organization, and Mathematical Economics.
演講摘要 : The term bargaining refers to a situation in which (i) individuals have the possibility of reaching a mutually beneficial agreement, (ii) there is a conflict of interests about which agreement to reach, and (iii) no agreement may be imposed on any individual without his approval. Since the publication of Nash’s (1950, 1953) pioneering working on bargaining, game theorists have developed an interesting collection of bargaining solutions with wide applications. Game-theoretic models of bargaining have become some of the most fruitful paradigms in game theory. The purpose of this talk is two-fold. First, I present recent advances that are aimed at strengthening bargaining solutions, relating to the requirement of convexity and multiplicity. Convexity is not satisfied by many familiar economic problems, while randomized devices are not practical for problems such as duopoly or labor-management bargaining. Advances in these directions greatly enhance the applicability of bargaining solutions as can be illustrated by duopoly and labor-management bargaining problems. Second, I also present recent advances that are aimed at unifying the various bargaining solutions. Existing bargaining solutions are developed individually and as such, they each miss certain features of the bargaining problem. Unifications are useful for better understanding, characterizing, and comparing various solutions.
