Voluntary Separation as a Sanctioning Device for Eternal Cooperation? An Experiment-Guided Theory
2014/07/22
研討會日期 : 2014-07-22
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Filip Vesely
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Vesely received his Ph.D. in Economics from Purdue University. He is currently an Associate Professor at University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee. His research fields are Monetary Economics and Macroeconomics.
演講摘要 : How do partners elicit and achieve long-term cooperation when both parties have the liberty to unilaterally terminate the relationship? In this paper, we first employ a laboratory experiment to investigate how cooperation comes about in a voluntarily separable repeated prisoner’s dilemma game (VSRPD). We observe behavioral patterns that are inconsistent with out-for-tat often assumed in the literature (Eeckhout, 2006; Fugiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fugiwara, 2009; Rob and Yang, 2010). In our experiment, most players prefer to stay with their defecting partners and then retaliate in the following period(s). We propose a proposition called Pro-Partnership Proposition as well as a new class of equilibria called CD-Indifferent Equilibrium to explain how eternal cooperation can be achieved with these behavioral traits observed in the lab. Tests using root-mean-squared deviations suggest that our advance in theory of VSRPD fit the data significantly better than all the strategies discussed in the literature.
