演講者簡介 : Professor Ko received his Ph.D. in Economics from Boston College in 2012. He is currently an Assistant Professor at Natioanl University of Singapore. His primary research fields are Applied Game Theory and Microeconomic Theory; secondary research fields are Industrial Organization, Public/Political Economics and Financial Economics.
演講摘要 : This paper considers a simple model to explain why the direct succession mechanism fails and the indirect counterpart succeeds in making smooth leadership transitions in Chinese Communist Party. Under direct succession where the successor is dictated by the incumbent leader, the successor, with unconstrained power once the incumbent leader retired, will deviate from the policy set by predecessors for a greater political surplus. In contrast, under indirect succession mechanism where the successor is dictated by the former leader, a patient successor prefers the continuation of existing policy because the former leader can punish the successor by intensifying political competition should the successor deviate.
