演講者簡介 : Professor Tang received his Ph.D. in Economics from The University of Texas at Austin in 2011. He is currently an Assistant Professor at Department of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. His research fields are Microeconomic Theory and Game Theory.
演講摘要 : We re-examine the school choice with consent problem studied by Kesten (2010). Consider that in the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (DA), a set of students consent to waive their priorities at better schools conditional on doing so does not hurt themselves. We first show that if a student is matched with an under demanded school (one that no student desires), then her assignment cannot be improved in Pareto improvements. We then propose an algorithm which iteratively removes such schools and students to improve the assignments of other students in DA. This algorithm shares the same structure as the EADAM algorithm proposed by Kesten (2010), achieves Pareto efficiency when all students consent and achieves constrained efficiency otherwise. We also offer a simpler intuition on consenting incentives and whose assignments should be improved.
