Information Manipulation in a multi-period sender-receiver game
2014/02/25
研討會日期 : 2014-02-25
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Jung, Hanjoon Michael
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Jung received his Ph.D. in Economics from Penn State University in 2007. He is currently Assistant Research Fellow at Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica. His Primary research fields are Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory and Industrial Organization; Secondary research field is Political Economy.
演講摘要 : The goal of this paper is to make a game-theoretic model about information manipulation among strategic players when a sender does not have any intrinsic concern for his credibility. The information manipulation is a situation in which a sender can manipulate information to influence receivers to make decisions in favor of his own preference. Jung (2009) showed that, if a sender has concern for his credibility as a source of truthful information and if receivers face a coordination situation, the information manipulation by the sender arises. This paper internalizes the sender's credibility concern and still shows this sender’s information manipulation. That is, the sender does not have any intrinsic concern for his credibility. However, the sender does care for his future payoffs in a multi-period game setting. As a result, the sender's concern for his future payoffs makes him care for his credibility as a source of truthful information. This endogenously generated credibility concern results in the information manipulation by the sender.
