演講者簡介 : Professor Luo received his Ph.D. in Economics from McGill University, at Canada in 2000. He is currently Associate Professor at National University of Singapore. His research fields are Game Theory, Economic Theory, Information Economics.
演講摘要 : In complex social interactions, Greenberg et al. (Economic Theory 40 (2009) 91-112) offered a uni ed solution concept of mutually acceptable course of action (MACA) for situations whereperfectlyrational individuals with different beliefs and views of the world agree to a shared course of action. In this paper we investigate epistemic conditions for MACA. In particular, within a standard semantic framework, we formulate and show, by using the notion of lexicographic probability system (LPS)introduced by Blume et al. (Econometrica 59 (1991a) 61-79), that MACA is the logical consequence of common knowledge of perfectrationality and mutual knowledge of agreement on the underlying course of action. In this paper, we also demonstrate how epistemic assumptions for various related game-theoretic solution concepts can be derived by varying the degree of completeness of the underlying course of action. This study is useful to deepen our understanding of MACA and other solution concepts in the literature, such as perfect equilibrium, (perfect) rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium, and (perfect) rationalizability.
