Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Proposers
2012/08/07
研討會日期 : 2012-08-07
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Pohan Fong
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Pohan Fong received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Rochester in 2005. He is currently serving as Assistant Professor of Economics and Finance at City University of Hong Kong. His research field is in institutions and economic performance, game theory, industrial organization and public finance.
演講摘要 : We present a theory of dynamic legislative bargaining in which (1) the policy made in one period becomes the status quo for the next, and (2) every proposer is endogenously determined through an all-pay auction. We fully characterize the stationary Markov perfect equilibrium for a model with three parties, a one-dimensional policy space, single-peaked preferences and symmetric distribution of the ideal points. We show that the median player never participates actively in the contest for proposal power. Thus the model predicts that key positions with agenda control would not be occupied by politicians with moderate ideological views. We also show that the two extreme players as proposer would propose more moderate policy than they would otherwise do in a single-period setup. This is in part due to the incentive to alleviate future competition costs. Overall the long-run policy choice is bounded away from the median policy provided the players are sufficiently impatient. But the generalized median voter theorem of Baron (1996) still holds if the parties are sufficiently patient.
