A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Evolutionary Game Theory
2012/12/04
研討會日期 : 2012-12-04
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Wei-Torng Juang
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Wei-Torng Juang received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Cambridge in 1998. He is currently serving as Associate Research Fellow of Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica. His research field is in game theory, mathematical economics and industrial economics.
演講摘要 : We study behaviors of evolutionary systems in the long run. In a system where players are randomly matched to play an N-player game in each period and players are allowed to revise their rules, we obtain a folk theorem on equilibrium selection: By introducing appropriate universally dominant rule profiles into the system, we may support any equilibrium in the long run. We also provide some examples of universally dominant rule profiles such as triggering rule, rules of H-M type, or in 2-player games, best response-pure imitation. This result is independent of how players select among different rules, as long as the rule selection criteria satisfy a weak monotonicity property.
