演講者簡介 : Shurojit Chatterji received his Ph.D. in Economics from SUNY at Stony Brook in 1993. He is currently serving as Professor of Economics at Singapore Management University. His research field is in microeconomic theory, dynamics, and incentives.
演講摘要 : We define a solution concept, perfectly contracted equilibrium, for an intertemporal exchange economy where agents are simultaneously price-takers in spot commodity markets while engaging in efficient, non-Walrasian contracting over future prices. Without requiring that agents have perfect foresight, we show that perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes are a subset of Pareto optimal allocations called attainable allocations. It is a robust possibility for perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes to differ from Arrow-Debreu equilibrium outcomes. We show that bilateral contracting will generate efficient, individually rational contracts; other examples of contracting procedures that lead to such contracts are also provided.
