Asymmetric Contests with Initial Winning Probability
2012/09/11
研討會日期 : 2012-09-11
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Hanjoon Michael Jung
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Hanjoon Michael Jung received his Ph.D. in Economics from Penn State University in 2007. He is currently serving as Assistant Research Fellow of Institute of Economics at Academia Sinica. His research field is in microeconomic theory, game theory, industrial organization, and political economy.
演講摘要 : In Game Theory, the contest literature studies a strategic situation in which players compete for prizes. Asymmetric contests with initial winning probability extend the competition models by introducing initial winning probability. The initial winning probability affects the players' willingness to participate in a contest while it reduces their incentives to play positive effort in the contest since there could be sufficiently large probability to claim their own initial winning probability. Consequently, the players' initial winning probability could decrease the competition among the players, which is measured by the effort that the players exert in the contest. Since, in some literature of the contest theory, the competition among the players has been regarded as a kind of dead-weight loss, the players in the model could benefit from the initial winning probability. We discuss possible scenarios that give rise to the asymmetric contests with initial winning probability.
