Sender's Small Concern for Credibility and Receiver's Dilemma
2012/04/03
研討會日期 : 2012-04-03
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Hanjoon Michael Jung
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Hanjoon Michael Jung received his Ph.D. in Economics from Penn State University in 2007. He is currently serving as Assistant Research Fellow of Institute of Economics at Academia Sinica. His research field is in microeconomic theory, game theory and industrial organization.
演講摘要 : We model a dilemma that receivers can face when the sender has small concern for his credibility. In an information transmission situation between one sender and possibly many receivers, suppose that the sender has small concern for his credibility in reporting truthful information. Then, responding to the receivers' strategies, the sender could have an incentive to reveal the true information which is referred to as incentive truthfulness. Next, due to this incentive truthfulness, the receivers cannot completely ignore the sender's signals. As a result, the receivers get to play only the sender's favorite outcome. This is the Receiver's Dilemma. We formulate general situations and conditions under which the receivers would fall in this dilemma. Then, we provide three possible scenarios of the Receiver's Dilemma.
