Could Schools Compete for Better Students by Choosing Entrance Examination Dates?
2012/02/21
研討會日期 : 2012-02-21
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Yi-Cheng Kao
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Yi-Cheng Kao received his Ph.D. in International Business from National Taiwan University in 2009. He is currently serving as Assistant Professor of Business Administration at Chung Yuan Christian University. His research field is in monetary and financial institutions, finance and econometrics.
演講摘要 : We develop a decentralized two-sided matching model with an imperfect screening device (entrance examination) in order to analyze the choice of examination dates by schools. In most cases, the second best school cannot attract better students by using a conflicting strategy. Nevertheless, when the two leading schools have similar prestige, students face a coordination problem and the conflicting strategy can be justified in one of the equilibria. We propose several equilibrium selection criterions and test them with a unique data set from Taiwanese graduate programs. Using the survival rates of students studying for more than regular years as a proxy for student quality, our empirical result suggests that the second best school will have lower student quality if it conflicts with the best one in the examination date, which supports the risk dominance criterion.
