演講者簡介 : Kuo-Chih Yuan received his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Essex in 2005. He is currently serving as Assistant Professor of Economics at National Taiwan University. His research field is in microeconomics.
演講摘要 : This paper introduces a new model of crowding games with incomplete information. We study a class of games in which simultaneous English auctions take place at separate markets, and each market has multiple identical units of a good to sell. Each bidder knows her own private valuation of the good and the valuation probability distribution over other bidders. A bidder needs at most one unit of the good. Each bidder chooses at most one market to participate. We analyze the bidders' mixed-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium and develop an algorithm to solve the equilibria of these games with finite types and finite markets. Furthermore, we examine the expected prices and the average surplus gained by the agents with a successful bid among markets.
