演講者簡介 : Yi-You Yang got his Ph.D. in Mathematics from Tsing Hua University in 2006. He is currently serving as Assistant Professor of Department of Applied Mathematics at Aletheia University. His research field is in coalition formation, mathematical economics, and game theory.
演講摘要 : Sengupta and Sengupta (1996) study the accessibility of the core of a TU game and show that the core, if non-empty, can be reached from any non-core allocation via a finite sequence of successive blocks. This paper complements the result by showing that when the core is empty, a number of non-empty core-extensions, including the least core and the weak least core (Maschler et al., 1979), the positive core (Orshan and Sudhölter, 2001) and the extended core (Bejan and Gómez, 2009), are accessible in a strong sense, namely each allocation in each of the foregoing core-extensions can be reached from any allocation through a finite sequence of successive blocks.
