演講者簡介 : Eric Szu-Wen Chou got his Ph.D. in Economics from University of California, Los Angeles in 2002. He is currently serving as Associate Professor of Department of Economics at National Tsing Hua University. His research field is in industrial organization, game theory, and contract theory.
演講摘要 : To help provide a foundation for the outside-options concept used in a popular property-rights theory of the firm, we construct a general equilibrium model of hold up in which the outside option is endogenously determined. We find that there exist hold-up (underinvestment) as well as rent-seeking (overinvestment) in equilibrium. We also show how the planner's problem can be decentralized as a competitive matching equilibrium and how inefficiency in the competitive matching equilibrium can be eliminated. The model provide a framework to examine how search externalities interact with the hold-up problem.
