Subjective Coalitional Equilibria and Coalitional Rationalizability
2011/01/21
研討會日期 : 2011-01-21
時間 : 14:00
主講人 : Mr. Chih-Chun Yang
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Chih-Chun Yang is going to get his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Rochester in May, 2011. His research field is in game theory and microeconomic theory. He is applying for the position of the Institute of Economics, AS right now.
演講摘要 : I propose a new notion of equilibrium in a finite normal form game where players are able to communicate by using correlated strategies and do not share a common prior belief. Subjective coalitional equilibrium is a refinement of Brandenburger and Dekel’s (1987, Econometrica 55, 1391-1402) a posteriori equilibrium. I prove that every finite normal form game has a subjective coalitional equilibrium. I show that Luo and Yang’s (2009, JET 144, 248-263) coalitional rationalizable set is outcome equivalent to a subjective coalitional equilibrium. Moreover, under the assumption of independent common priors, subjective coalitional equilibria are ex ante identical to the intersection of the set of Nash equilibria and coalitional rationalizable sets.
