演講者簡介 : Hanjoon Michael Jung got his Ph.D. in Economics from Pennsylvania State University in 2007. He is currently serving as Assistant Research Fellow of Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica. His research field is in microeconomic theory, game theory and industrial organization.
演講摘要 : We propose a revised version of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a general multi-period game with observed actions. In finite games, perfect Bayesian equilibria are weakly consistent and subgame perfect Nash equilibria. In general games that allow a continuum of types and strategies, however, perfect Bayesian equilibria might not satisfy these rational conditions. To solve this problem, we revise its definition by replacing Bayes’ rule with a regular conditional probability. We call this revised solution concept a perfect regular equilibrium. Perfect regular equilibria are always weakly consistent and subgame perfect Nash equilibria in general games. In addition, perfect regular equilibria are equivalent to simplified perfect Bayesian equilibria in finite games. Therefore, the perfect regular equilibrium is an extended and simple version of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a general multi-period game with observed actions.
