A Strategic Approach To Software Protection: Revisit And Extension
2010/09/21
研討會日期 : 2010-09-21
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Ho-Chyuan Chen
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Ho-Chyuan Chen got his Ph.D. in Economics from Texas A&M University in 1995. He is currently serving as Professor of Economics at National Chung-Cheng University. His research field is in industrial economics, competitive policy and game theory.
演講摘要 : There are two purposes for this revisit to Shy and Thisse (1999). One is to present the correct expressions for the errors in their paper and the ensuing changes in the results; one is to extend their model to a more general setting for exploring what they leave out. We then find that, in the software industry with sufficiently high services value to support-dependent consumers, both firms choose non-protection when network effects are sufficiently strong. “Both firms protect” and “both firms unprotect” are the two Nash equilibria, when the network effects are medium, with the former equilibrium dominates the latter. Both firms choose protection when network effects are relatively weak and if some certain high level of services utility is met. Contrarily, in the software industry with a sufficiently small services value, both firms choose protection regardless of the level of network effects, in which only some of both types of consumers use software.
