演講者簡介 : Ning Sun got his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Tsukuba in 1998. He is currently serving as Professor of School of Economics at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. His research field is in microeconomic theory, general equilibrium theory, auction mechanism design and game theory.
演講摘要 : We investigate matchings in social economic networks--the problem of who should be matched to whom by which contracts in the social economic networks. A social economic network consists of many individuals and organizations (such as employees, firms, governments, markets). Each individual or organization may contribute to other individuals or organizations (i.e. downstream relations) and may also need to be served by one or many individuals or organizations (i.e. upstream relations). For instance, a person may work for a government and get salary in return, but need to buy food, clothes or service from other individuals or organizations. Each individual is governed by contracts with his possibly associated parties. In such networks, relationships among individuals and organizations may form trees, acyclic networks, or circles. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable matching in the network and develop an adjustment process for finding a stable matching in finitely many steps. We further examine various properties of stable matchings and discuss a wide range of applications of this new development.
