Partnership-Enhancement and Stability in Matching Problems
2010/04/27
研討會日期 : 2010-04-27
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Koichi Tadenuma
地點 : B110
演講者簡介 : Koichi Tadenuma got his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Rochester in 1989. He is currently serving as Professor of Economics at Hitotsubashi University. His research interest is in social choice theory, welfare economics and game theory.
演講摘要 : In two-sided matching problems, we consider "natural" changes in preferences of agents in which only the rankings of current partners are enhanced. We introduce two desirable properties of matching rules under such rank-enhancements of partners. One property requires that an agent who becomes higher ranked by the original partner should not be punished. We show that this property cannot always be met if the matchings are required to be stable. However, if only one agent changes his preferences, the above requirement is compatible with stability, and moreover, envy-minimization in stable matchings can also be attained. The other property is a solidarity property, requiring that all of the "irrelevant" agents, whose preferences as well as whose original partners' preferences are unchanged, should be affected in the same way; either all weakly better off or all worse off. We show that when matchings are required to be stable, this property does not always hold.
