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研討會總覽

Information, Incentives, and Delegation of Authority

2010/04/06
  • 研討會日期 : 2010-04-06
  • 時間 : 14:00
  • 主講人 : Mr. Dongryul Lee
  • 地點 : B110
  • 演講者簡介 : Dongryul Lee is going to get his Ph.D. in Economics from Virginia Tech in May, 2010. His research interest is in game theory and application, industrial organization, theory of contests and tournaments, and public goods and behavioral economics ( non-selfish behavior). He is applying for a position of Institute of Economics, AS right now.
  • 演講摘要 : We study an optimal allocation of authority and effort incentives in a principal-agent model with asymmetric information. First, we study the optimal contract between a principal and an agent that specifies the allocation of authority over project selection and a wage schedule that is contingent on the outcome of the project. We find that consideration of effort incentives and informational asymmetries between the principal and the agent makes the principal delegate the authority over project selection to the agent. Moreover, the informed agent has an incentive to reveal his information to the principal before the principal offers a contract. However, the information transmission from the agent to the principal does not happen due to the agent's inability to commit to reveal the information truthfully. We then extend our model to the case where the principal delegates the authority over project selection to multiple agents and the agents select and implement a project. We suggest three different forms of delegation to multiple agents to induce information revelation by the informed agents: delegation with a simple mechanism design, delegation with bargaining among the agents, and delegation with division of labor. We show that the information asymmetry can be overcome indirectly by delegating the authority to agents whose preferences over project selection are biased in opposite directions. We also find that delegating the authority entirely to the agents may be better for the principal than designing a mechanism for the purpose of extracting information, and that the division of labor can solve the problem of information asymmetry as well.