Complete Sequential Equilibrium and Its Alternative
2010/05/04
研討會日期 : 2010-05-04
時間 : 14:00
主講人 : Professor Hanjoon Michael Jung
地點 : B110
演講者簡介 : Hanjoon Michael Jung got his Ph.D. in Economics from Penn State University in 2007. He is currently serving as Assistant Professor of Economics at Lahore University of Management Sciences. His research interest is in microeconomic theory, game theory, and industrial organization. He is applying for a position of Institute of Economics, AS right now.
演講摘要 : We propose a complete version of the sequential equilibrium (CSE) and its alternative solution concept (WCSE) for general .nite-period games with observed actions. The sequential equilibrium (SE) is not a complete solution concept in that it might not be a Nash equilibrium in the general games that allow a continuum of types and strategies. The CSE is always a Nash equilibrium in the general games and is equivalent to the SE in .nite games. So, the CSE is a complete solution concept in the general games as a version of the SE. The WCSE is a weak, but simple version of the CSE. It is also a complete solution concept and functions as an alternative solution concept to the CSE. Their relation to converted versions of the perfect equilibrium and the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is discussed.
