Unemployment Insurance, Labor Supply and Capital Accumulation: Work and Produce More with Insurance?
2010/03/26
研討會日期 : 2010-03-26
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : 徐敏鐘助理教授
地點 : B110
演講者簡介 : Minchung Hsu got his Ph.D. in Economics from University of California, Log Angeles in 2007. He is currently serving as Assistant Professor of Economics at National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies. His research interest is in macroeconomics and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models.
演講摘要 : This paper investigates endogenous labor supply in a dynamic equilibrium environment with incomplete markets and government provision of partial unemployment insurance. Marcet, Obiols-Homs and Weil (2007, Journal of Monetary Economics) introduce endogenous labor in an Aiyagari-Hugget type model, and suggest that labor supply and output are likely to be higher with full insurance than without insurance (i.e. under incomplete markets) because the wealth effect on labor supply could outweigh the decrease in precautionary savings. Since they focus on the comparison between a full-insurance economy and a non-insurance economy, we further investigate the labor supply, capital accumulation and output in a more realistic environment where that unemployment insurance is operated by government and financed by payroll tax. Our quantitative experiments with a carefully calibrated model show that the tax effect on labor dominates the wealth effect and therefore labor supply and output are both lower with the provision of unemployment insurance. We also find that the wealth is more concentrated with unemployment insurance.
