An Axiomatization of the Uniform Rule without the Pareto Principle
2010/06/01
研討會日期 : 2010-06-01
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Stephen Ching
地點 : B110
演講者簡介 : Stephen Ching got his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Rochester in 1994. He is currently serving as Associate Professor of Faculty of Business and Economics at The University of Hong Kong. His research interest is in game theory, mechanism design, industrial organization, and international economics.
演講摘要 : Our objective is to identify strategy-proof rules in the allocation problem à la Sprumont (1991). He showed that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, effciency, and anonymity (or no-envy). While it was found that in this characterization, either anonymity or no-envy (fairness condition) can be relaxed to weak symmetry (Ching 1994), whether the characterization can be strengthened along the efficiency dimension has remained open. This question is taken up by this paper. We show that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, continuity, weak symmetry, and a null-player condition, i.e. Sprumont’s (1991) characterization of the uniform rule is further strengthened by relaxing efficiency to continuity and the null-player condition.
