Fee versus Royalty Policy in Licensing through Bargaining: An Application of the Nash Bargaining Solution
2010/03/23
研討會日期 : 2010-03-23
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Shigeo Muto
地點 : B110
演講者簡介 : Shigeo Muto got his Ph.D. in Operations Research from Connell University in 1978. He is currently serving as Professor of Social Engineering at Tokyo Institute of Technology. His research interest is in Game Theory, Operations Research, Decision Making, and Information.
演講摘要 : In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patentholding firm negotiates with its rival firm about payments for licensing a costreducing innovation. Applying the Nash bargaining solution, we compare two licensing policies, a fixed fee and a royalty. Our results are as follows: Royalty licensing is better than fixed fee licensing for both firms if the innovation is not drastic. So, royalty licensing is always carried out. Moreover, though there exists a case in which consumers prefer fixed fee licensing, royalty licensing is always superior to fixed fee licensing from the social point of view.
