Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values
2010/03/16
研討會日期 : 2010-03-16
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Funaki Yuki
地點 : B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Funaki Yuki為Ph.D. in Systems Science，Tokyo Institute of Technology (1985)。現為Professor of School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University。其主要研究領域為Game Theory, Mathematical Economics, Experimental Economics。
演講摘要 : We generalize the null player property (satisfied by the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (satisfied by the equal division solution) to the so-called δ-reducing player property, stating that a δ-reducing player (being a player such that any coalition containing this player earns a fraction δ ∈ [0, 1] of the worth of that coalition without player i) earns a zero payoff. This property yields the null player property for δ = 1 and the nullifying player property for δ = 0. We show that efficiency, symmetry, linearity and this δ-reducing player property characterizes the corresponding δ-discounted Shapley value. Moreover, we provide a strategic implementation of these solutions where δ is a discount factor that determines the decrease in value to be distributed in the next round after the proposal is rejected and the remaining players (without the proposer) play a new round of bidding.
