Experimentation on Dividing Gain: Political Institution versus Market Institution
2009/10/27
研討會日期 : 2009-10-27
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : 楊建成特聘研究員
地點 : B110
演講者簡介 : 楊建成教授為Ph.D. in Economics，Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (1989)。現為本所特聘研究員。其主要研究領域為公共經濟學及政治經濟學。
演講摘要 : This paper offers experimental evidence to shed light on how institutions may shape human interaction in dividing gains. We compares political institution with market institution and specifically focus on two games: the “market game” (MG) (an ultimatum game with proposer competition) and the “political game” (PG) (a majoritarian ultimatum game with responder competition). The unique subgame perfect equilibrium prediction for both MG and PG is that the monopolistic bargaining side will reap all the gains, whereas the competitive bargaining side will receive nothing. We conduct experiments to examine this prediction. Our evidence reveals that while competitors’ payoffs race to the bottom along with their chosen status quos in MG (consistent with the prediction), competitors’ payoffs converge to a stable level in PG (contrary to the prediction) even though their chosen stats quos race to the bottom as well. Through the experimental design of a game between PG and MG, we find that whether institutions endow competitors with the active power to cast yea or nay votes is the key to make the difference.
