Does Patent Protection Stimulate or Stifle Innovation?
2009/11/03
研討會日期 : 2009-11-03
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : 朱智豪助研究員
地點 : B110
演講者簡介 : 朱智豪教授為Ph.D. in Economics，University of Michigan (2008)。現為本所助研究員。其主要研究領域為總體經濟、經濟成長及知識產權政策。
演講摘要 : This study develops an R&D-based growth model that features both vertical and horizontal innovation to shed some light on the current debate on whether patent protection stimulates or stifles innovation. Specifically, we analyze the growth and welfare effects of patent protection in the form of profit division between sequential innovators along the quality ladder. We show that patent protection has asymmetric effects on vertical innovation (i.e. quality improvement) and horizontal innovation (i.e. variety expansion). Maximizing the incentives for vertical (horizontal) innovation requires a profit-division rule that assigns the entire profit to the entrant (incumbent) of a quality ladder. In light of this finding, we argue that in order to understand the growth and welfare implications of patent protection, it is important to firstly disentangle its different effects on vertical and horizontal innovation.
