Optimal Organization for Sequential Investments with Know-How Transmission
2009/09/29
研討會日期 : 2009-09-29
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : 蔡崇聖助理教授
地點 : B110
演講者簡介 : 蔡崇聖教授為Ph.D. in Economics，University of Wisconsin-Madison (2002)。現為清華大學經濟系助理教授。其主要研究領域為公共經濟學、個體經濟學及政治經濟學。
演講摘要 : We consider a sequential investment problem where the agent can invest in know-how in the first stage, and the same agent (“integration”) or another agent (“separation”) can invest in production in the second stage. The final outcome of the project depends upon both the agent’s investments and the first-stage outcome, which, however, are unobservable to the principal. In order to stop the project when the first stage is a failure, the principal has to pay the agent an information rent for him to reveal the truth. We consider that the first-stage agent has a choice to transmit his know-how to the second-stage agent, in which the agent bears a cost under separation. It is straightforward that the principal prefers integration when the cost in transmission of know-how is too large; however, the result can be reversed if the second-stage agent’s performance in terms of the project being finally succeed is high enough, because the first-stage agent has a strong incentive to transmit his know-how, so that the information rent can be reduced under separation.
