演講者簡介 : 馮勃翰教授為Ph.D. in Economics，University of Rochester (2005)。現為香港城市大學經濟及金融系助理教授。其主要研究領域為政治經濟學、應用個體理論及賽局理論。
演講摘要 : This paper presents a dynamic model of election, government formation, and legislation in a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation in which the policy chosen in one period becomes the status quo for the next period. The electorate votes strategically by taking into account the likely governments that parties would form and the policies they would choose as a function of the status quo. The status quo thus affects both the election outcomes and the bargaining power of the parties during government formation. A formateur party thus has incentives to strategically position the current policy to gain an advantage in both the next election and the subsequent bargaining over government formation and policy choice. These incentives can give rise to centrifugal forces that result in policies that are outside the Pareto set of the parties.
