1. Structure Theorems for Rationalizability and Robust Predictions of Refinements 2. Belief-bas
2009/07/24
研討會日期 : 2009-07-24
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : 陳逸群助理教授
地點 : B110
演講者簡介 : 陳逸群教授為Ph.D. in Economics，Northwestern University (2009)。現為新加坡國立大學經濟系助理教授。其主要研究領域為Microeconomics Theory、Game Theory、Mathematical Economics、Information Economics。
演講摘要 : 1. Structure Theorems for Rationalizability and Robust Predictions of Refinements
We first review the structure theorem for rationalizability due to Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) in static games. We then establish the structure theorem in any finite extensive-form game with perfect recall and suitably rich payoff parameters. We study the implications of our results on the notion of sequential rationality.
2. Belief-based Topologies on Types (joint with Alfredo Di Tillio, Eduard Faingold, and Siyang Xiong)
We study the continuity of the correspondence of interim correlated epsilon-rationalizable actions in incomplete information games. We introduce a topology on types, called uniform-weak topology, under which two types of a player are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar probabilities to other players having similar first-order beliefs, and so on, where the degree of similarity is uniform over the levels of the belief hierarchy. First, we show that the uniform-weak topology is finer than the uniform-strategic topology introduced by Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006). Second, we prove a partial converse: around finite types, the uniform-weak topology is equivalent to the strategic topology (and hence to the uniform-strategic topology). Finally, we show that the set of finite types is nowhere dense under the uniform strategic topology, which implies that the uniform-strategic topology is strictly finer than the strategic topology.
