Do Separation Laws Matter? An Experimental Study of Commitment
2009/04/28
研討會日期 : 2009-04-28
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : 雷文潔副教授
地點 : B110
演講者簡介 : 雷文潔女士為Ph.D. in Economics，Purdue University (2000)。現為University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 經濟系副教授，目前於本所訪問中。其主要研究領域為Macroeconomics、Experimental Economics、Behavioral Finance。
演講摘要 : Coasian reasoning predicts that the conditions under which parties may terminate a partnership will affect bargaining between partners, but not the durability of partnerships. This paper endeavors to test both predictions in an experimental setting that allows agents to form and end partnerships endogenously and to bargain over resources. We find that separation rules have less effect on bargaining than predicted by theory, but larger effects on partnership stability. Perhaps surprisingly, agents who are weaker relative to their partners are more successful when either party can end a partnership unilaterally than when both must consent to a separation.
