演講者簡介 : 胡台威先生為Ph.D. in Economics，The Pennsylvania State University (June 2009 expected)。其主要研究
領域為Game Theory、Decision Theory、Monetary Economics。
演講摘要 : Unpredictable behavior is central for optimal play in many strategic situations because a predictable pattern leaves a player vulnerable to exploitation. A theory of unpredictable behavior is presented in the context of repeated two-person zero-sum games in which the stage games have no pure strategy equilibrium. Computational complexity considerations are introduced to restrict players' strategy sets. The use of Kolmogorov complexity allows us to obtain a sufficient condition for equilibrium existence. The resulting theory has implications for the empirical literature that tests the equilibrium hypothesis in a similar context. In particular, the failure of some tests for randomness does not justify rejection of equilibrium play.
