演講者簡介 : Professor Liang received her Ph.D. in Economics from University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1999. She is currently Associate Research Fellow at Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica. Her research fields are Industrial Organization, Microeconomics and Mathematical Economics.
演講摘要 : In models of tax compliance, the existence of a budget or capacity constraint on tax enforcement creates a complementarity between taxpayers' ’incentives to comply. All else equal, the higher the level of non-compliance in the population, the lower the likelihood any individual will be caught underreporting. A constraint on audit capacity may therefore lead to multiple equilibria to the income reporting game amongst tax-payers (“tax riots”). In spite of this, our main result shows that this multiplicity must disappear when the number of possible income types in the population is allowed to become arbitrarily large. Our result holds regardless of whether or not the government can commit to its audit policy
