Peer Evaluation in Networks

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• 研討會日期 : 2008-04-29
• 時間 : 14:30
• 主講人 : 袁國芝
• 地點 : B棟110室
• 演講者簡介 : Professor Kuo-Chih Yuan 為Ph.D. in Economics，University of Essex。 目前為台灣大學經濟系助理教授。 其主要研究領域為網路理論、賽局理論及個體經濟理論。
• 演講摘要 : Peer evaluation, as a new alternative to traditional performance appraisal, has recently become to one of the major evaluation approaches. Despite peer evaluation’s growing use and potentially high validity, research has yet developed a fundamental framework for analyzing the economic behavior of individuals as both evaluators (raters) and objects of evaluation (ratees) in an evaluation network. Our research aims to study the relationship between the agents’ behavior and the structure of peer evaluation network. Raters’ appraisals may weigh differently according to the evaluators’ positions in the network. We propose a two-stage game approach and analyze the equilibrium outcomes with two different allocation rules, Simple Weighted Allocation Rule (SWAR) and Myerson Weighted Allocation Rule (MWAR), under a variety of network structures. We have proven the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium effort. We also found that the number of a player’s neighbors may increase or decrease her equilibrium effort level, and some players may increase their equilibrium efforts but some may decrease when the allocation rule of the game switches from SWAR to MWAR. The second part of our paper forces on the set of pair-wise stable networks. We extend our previous setting and construct a three-stage game. Players first form an evaluation network, and then they choose their efforts and appraise others’ performance. Under the concept of pair-wise stability, we found that the complete network is the unique equilibrium outcome when the number of players is not large. Finally, we extend our approach with several possible concepts, which includes costly connections and capacity of connections.