Are eBay Auctions Efficient? A Sequential Auction Model with Buyer Entries
2008/05/27
研討會日期 : 2008-05-27
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : 黃景沂
地點 : B棟110室
演講者簡介 : Professor Ching-I Huang 為 Ph.D. in Economics，Northwestern University (2006)。
目前為台灣大學經濟系助理教授。
其主要研究領域為產業組織及個體計量。
演講摘要 : I use a sequential-auction model to mimic the environment of Internet auction sites, such as eBay. For a sequence of auctions, new buyers may enter the auction site after some of the auctions has completed and only bid for the remaining auctions. Because an incumbent buyer may have revealed their own valuation in earlier auctions while a new entrant do not, their expectations about the future are asymmetric. As a result, a buyer with a lower valuation may win an auction while a buyer with a higher valuation may restrain from bidding higher, resulting an inefficient allocation. On the contrary, selling the multiple items in a one-shot simultaneous auction results in an efficient outcome. The profit from selling all items together in one simultaneous auction is less than that from selling them sequentially. Consequently, sellers may exploit the information asymmetry to obtain a higher profit.
