Nation States vs. United Empire: Effects of Political Competition on Economic Growth
2008/04/22
研討會日期 : 2008-04-22
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Angus C. Chu
地點 : B棟110室
演講者簡介 : Professor Angus C. Chu 為 Ph.D. in Economics，University of Michigan (2008)。
目前為本所助研究員。
其主要研究領域為總體經濟、經濟成長、專利政策、政治經濟及行為經濟。
演講摘要 : Is the European nation-state system more favorable to economic growth than the united-empire system in ancient China? This paper develops an endogenous-growth model to analyze the conditions under which economic growth is higher under political fragmentation than political unification. Under political unification, the economy is vulnerable to excessive Leviathan taxation and the costs of unifying heterogeneous populations. Under political fragmentation, the competing rulers are constrained in taxation but spend excessively on military defense. If and only if the heterogeneity costs are sufficiently high relative to the mobility cost of citizens or equilibrium defense spending, then political fragmentation would be more favorable to growth than political unification. When the political regime is endogenously chosen by rulers, they do not always choose the growth-maximizing regime. In particular, there exists a range of values for the heterogeneity costs, in which political fragmentation is more favorable to growth but the rulers prefer political unification.
