Peddling Influence through Intermediaries: Propaganda
2007/07/17
研討會日期 : 2007-07-17
時間 : 17:00
主講人 : Prof. Wei Li
地點 : B棟110室
演講者簡介 : Prof. Wei Li為Ph.D. in Economics, MIT 。
目前為加州大學河濱分校助理教授。
其主要研究領域為Information Economics、Contract Theory及 Applied Game Theory。
演講摘要 : Information may be transmitted directly to a target audience, or indirectly through intermediaries. How does using an intermediary affect the incentives of a sender with private information to communicate truthfully? In this paper, the sender and an intermediary may be independently objective or biased: a biased agent always wants to push a particular agenda but also to appear objective to the target audience. The paper finds that if the sender chooses to communicate directly, his reporting accuracy decreases in his signal quality, but may eventually increase in it if his signal becomes sufficiently informative. If he communicates through an intermediary, each agent's reporting accuracy increases in that of the other's. Moreover, a biased sender lies more with indirect communication. If the sender has moderately high reputation concerns and if his signal is sufficiently informative, he prefers indirect communication because he appears less biased. If the sender's reputation concerns are sufficiently convex and he is very likely to be biased, he prefers direct communication.
