Revenue Ranking in Asymmetric Common Value Auctions
2007/07/20
研討會日期 : 2007-07-20
時間 : 17:00
主講人 : Prof. Harrison Cheng
地點 : B棟110室
演講者簡介 : Prof. Harrison Cheng為Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley (1977) 。
目前為Associate Professor, University of Southern California。
其主要研究領域為General Equilibriun、Game Theory 及 Chinese Economic Development。
演講摘要 : We consider a model of auction with discrete valuations and continuous strategies. We show a general ranking result in asymmetric common value auctions with independent signals: the first price auction dominates the second price auction. This is first done for discrete destitutions. The extension to the continuum case seems to be true as well but it is complicated by the multiple equilibria problem. We plan to show that the multiple equilibria problem is not a serious one when there is a small private value component in valuation.
