Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace?
2008/01/29
研討會日期 : 2008-01-29
時間 : 15:30
主講人 : Tomas Sjostrom
地點 : B棟110室
演講者簡介 : Prof. Tomas Sjostrom為Ph.D. in Economics, University of Rochester（1991）。
其主要研究領域為Game Theory, Mathematical Economics, and Social Choice Theory。
現為Professor，Rutgers University。
演講摘要 : The conventional wisdom that democracy is good for peace relies on the empirical fact that fully democratic countries rarely fight each other. However, the relationship between democracy and conflict is subtle and non-linear. We classify countries as full democracies, limited democracies, and dictatorships. The data suggest that limited democracies are more aggressive than other regime types, including dictatorships, and not only during periods when the regime type is changing. Specifically, a dyad of limited democracies is more likely to be involved in a militarized dispute than any other dyad. Thus, while full democratization might advance the cause of peace, limited democratization might advance the cause of war. We also find that as the environment becomes more hostile, fully democratic countries (such as the U.S.) become more aggressive faster than other regime types. This complex empirical relationship between democracy and peace is consistent with a simple game-theoretic model of "Schelling's dilemma", where limited democracies are defined to be countries where the leader can stay in power by appeasing hawkish minorities.
