Monetary Stakes and Socioeconomic Characteristics in Ultimatum Games: An Experiment with Nation-Wide
2007/05/29
研討會日期 : 2007-05-29
時間 : 15:00
主講人 : Prof. Yang, Cheng-Chen
地點 : B棟110室
演講者簡介 : Prof. Yang, Cheng-Chen為Ph.D. in Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (1989)。
現為本所特聘研究員。
其主要研究領域為Public Economics及Political Economics。
演講摘要 : We conduct an experiment on ultimatum games with subjects who are representative of a nation. The focus of our study is on the effect of the size of monetary stakes and the role of socioeconomic characteristics in explaining players’ behavior. It is found that: (i) raising stakes substantially reduce the number of “outlines” in both offers and rejections; (ii) higher stakes exert a significant impact on players’ offer and rejection behavior as the standard economic theory predicts even for inexperienced or one-shot play; (iii) socioeconomic characteristics dominate responders’ behavior when stakes are low, whereas monetary stakes dominates responders’ behavior when stakes are high; (iv) age has a lifecycle effect on players’ behavior when stakes are low: those subjects who are young and old offer less and reject less often than those who are in the middle age; and (v) women reject less often than men, but there is no gender difference in offer behavior.
