演講者簡介 : Mr. Stephen, Jui-Hsien Chou為Ph.D. in Economics，McGill University (June 2007 expected)。
其主要研究領域為International Economics、Industrial Organization、Natural Resource and Environmental Economics、Game Theory 。
現正申請本所研究職務中。
演講摘要 : This paper presents a model of tariff war involving n resource-importing countries and a coalition of resource-exporting countries that acts as a resource-cartel, coordinating the extraction paths of their resource-extracting .rms. We deal with two different tariff war scenarios. In the first scenario, which we call the bilateral monopoly scenario, all resource-importing countries form a coalition that imposes a common tariff rate on the exhaustible resource. In the second scenario, the resource-importing countries act independently, each imposing its own tariff rate. We compare the outcomes under the two tariff war scenarios and with the free-trade outcome. In our model, it turns out that, given the rate of discount, there is a corresponding threshold level of the marginal cost parameter beyond which the resource-importing countries would prefer bilateral monopoly to world-wide free trade. The higher is the rate of discount, the greater is the correspoding threshold marginal cost level. We study the effects of asymmetry between resource-importing countries on the welfare of the exporting country, and of the importing countries. In the final section, we examine the welfare consequence of splitting the resource stock into two (possibly unequal) parts to serve the two import markets. It turns out that such market segregation is harmful to the exporting country.
