演講者簡介 : Mr. Yuan-Chuan Lien為Ph.D. Economics，Stanford University (June 2007 expected)。
其主要研究領域為Microeconomic Theory、Applied Microeconomics、Market Design、Experimental Economics、Financial Economics。
現正申請本所研究職務中。
演講摘要 : This research studies an equilibrium model of college admissions in which students apply to a limited number of colleges. Students choose colleges based on the probabilities of being admitted. The probabilities are in turn determined by the number and quality of the students who apply to those colleges. This paper shows that although the average quality of enrolled students is an increasing function of college quality, the number of applicants per position is not. Admission rates too may fail to be monotonic if colleges engage in yield protection, a practice in which colleges do not admit the students who are most qualified are unlikely to enroll. Consequently, attempts to rank colleges based on these statistics could be misleading. Furthermore, in our model some colleges would prefer an early admission market where the number of applications a student can send is more limited.
