Asymmetric Information, Auditing Commitment, and Economic Growth
2006/08/01
研討會日期 : 2006-08-01
時間 : 15:00
主講人 : Prof. Yong Wang
地點 : B棟110會議室
演講者簡介 : Prof. Yong Wang為Ph.D. in Economics, Brown University。
現為Associate Professor，City University of Hong Kong。
其主要研究領域為Macroeconomic Theory、Financial and Monetary Economics及Growth Theory 。
演講摘要 : This paper examines the commitment effects of auditing contract in a credit market in which the costly state verification (CSV) problem prevails. In particular, we compare two endogenous growth models of which one allows lenders to commit to a costly auditing strategy to identify the investment returns of borrowers and the other does not. To model the interaction between lenders and borrowers in the no-commitment case, we follow the framework pioneered by Khalil (1997). We find that the regime without commitment is associated with a higher loan rate, a higher auditing probability, lower economic growth rate and lower social welfare.
