The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path
2006/03/28
研討會日期 : 2006-03-28
時間 : 15:00
主講人 : 陳國樑教授
地點 : B棟110室
演講者簡介 : 陳國樑教授為Ph.D. in Economics, Johns Hopkins University (2004)。
現為東京大學經濟系助理教授。
其主要研究領域為Industrial Organization、Applied Microeconomics、Financial Economics。
演講摘要 : Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modeled the oligopoly stage game as a Prisoners’ Dilemma. Using numerical analysis, we consider the Bertrand price game and allow the probability of detection and penalties to be sensitive to firms’ prices. Consistent with earlier results, a maximal leniency program necessarily makes collusion more difficult. However, we also find that partial leniency programs - such as in the U.S. - can make collusion easier compared to offering no leniency. We also show that even if cartel formation is not deterred, a leniency program can reduce the prices charged by firms.
