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The SGP and The ECB: An Exercise in Asymmetry


  • 研討會日期 : 2005-09-27
  • 時間 : 15:00
  • 主講人 : Prof. David Mayes
  • 地點 : B棟110室
  • 演講者簡介 : David G Mayes is Advisor to the Board of the Bank of Finland in Helsinki and Professor of Economics at South Bank University in London. Before taking up his present position in 1997 he had worked as Chief Economist and Chief Manager at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. He has held a variety of public and academic posts in the UK and New Zealand, notably being Director of the NZ Institute of Economic Research, Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute of Social Research and Group Head at the National Economic Development Office in London. Since completing his doctorate on European integration in 1971, he has published widely in the academic journals and written more than 25 books, the latest of which Improving Banking Supervision was published by Palgrave in May and the next Social Exclusion and European Policy will be published by Edward Elgar in October. His main work continues to be in monetary policy and central bank strategy. He is an Editor of the Economic Journal.
  • 演講摘要 : Using panel data for the euro area countries in the period since 1972 this paper explores, in the context of a small model of the EU economy, the degree to which macroeconomic policy has been asymmetric. It shows in particular that monetary policy has been much more responsive to threats that inflation would lie outside the price stability target than to equal sized shocks within the target zone. Similarly monetary policy has responded to threats of large positive and negative output gaps but has remained largely unresponsive to smaller divergences. It thus appears that the ECB and its predecessors have been avoiding 'fine-tuning' but have been aggressive is responding to substantial threats to macroeconomic stability. In the light of this finding one can reflect on the asymmetries in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), that imposes penalties on excessive budgetary deficits. The paper examines the sense of the SGP, as revised in March 2005, in the light of these findings, and the role the ECB plays vis-a-vis these policies. In particular it considers the new provisions for behaviour in 'good times' and improved governance.