Background : Prof.Youngsub Chun為Ph.D. in Economics，University of Rochester (1996)。
現為Professor，Seoul National University。
其主要研究領域為賽局理論、公共經濟理論及機制設計。
Abstract : This We explore the implications of no-envy (Foley, 1967) in the context of queueing problems. We identify an easy way of checking whether a rule satisfies efficiency and no-envy. The existence of such a rule can easily be established. Next, we ask whether there is a rule satisfying efficiency and noenvy together with an additional solidarity requirement: every agent should be affected in the same direction as a consequence of changes in the waiting costs. However, there is no rule satisfying efficiency, no-envy, and either one of two cost monotonicity axioms. To remedy the situation, we propose two modifications of no-envy, backward/forward no-envy and adjusted no-envy. Also, we discuss whether three fairness requirements, no-envy, the identical preferences lower bound, and egalitarian equivalence, are compatible in this contex.
